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Abstract
Until very recently, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene.
Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have lately induced philosophers
working on causation – as e.g. Hall (2004) or Beebee (2006) – to direct their attention back
to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the most recent proposals of regularity theories, the
essay at hand will therefore reassess the criticism brought forward against regularity accounts
since Mackie’s famous, yet failed, (1974) attempts at analyzing causation with recourse to reg-
ularities among types of events. It will be shown that most of these objections target strikingly
over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches, which no present-day regularity theorists would se-
riously consider worth a second thought. By outlining ways to refute these objections it will be
argued that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty
– to say the least.
1 Introduction
A mere glance at the abundance of controversial literature on causation, published dur-
ing the past 30 years, reveals that regularity accounts of causation – until very recently
– virtually vanished from the scene. For lack of space and interest, studies not pri-
marily concerned with causation every now and then roughly explicated our causal
intuitions in terms of regularities, but hardly anybody seriously wanting to analyze
causation resorted to regularity accounts any more. Problems encountered within other
theoretical frameworks have lately induced philosophers working on causation – as
e.g. Hall (2004) or Beebee (2006) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic
analyses. In light of the most recent proposals of regularity theories as can be found
in Graßhoff and May (2001) and May (1999), the essay at hand will therefore reassess
the criticism brought forward against regularity accounts since Mackie’s famous, yet
failed, (1974) attempts at analyzing causation with recourse to regularities among types
of events.
Notwithstanding the scepticism encountered by Hume’s regularity theoretic succes-
sors, there are several commonly acknowledged advantages of an analysis of causation
in terms of regularities. A regularity theoretic notion of causation directly mirrors cen-
tral pre-theoretic intuitions with respect to the cause-effect relation expressible in well-
known principles as “The same cause is always accompanied by the same effect” or
“If no cause is present, no effect occurs”. Moreover, the conceptual apparatus resorted
to by a regularity theoretic analysis is fully embedded within the uncontroversial and
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well mastered area of extensional standard logic. Furthermore, unlike e.g. counterfac-
tual accounts regularity theories straightforwardly handle cases of overdetermination.
As against interventionist or manipulatory accounts, analyses of causation in terms of
regularities do not run the risk of being anthropocentric. Contrary to probabilistic ac-
counts, regularity theories are not compromised by paradoxical data as, for instance,
generated in cases of Simpson’s Paradox. Finally, while transference theories treat
a fundamental type of causal process, transference processes, as conceptually prim-
itive and thus do not attempt to provide a reductive analysis of causation, regularity
accounts, properly conceived, offer the promising prospect of explicating the cause-
effect relation – or at least one among possibly several types of cause-effect relations1
– in entirely non-causal terms.
Due to limited space, a regularity theoretic analysis of causation cannot be fully
developed here. I have done this elsewhere.2 The pages to come will thence simply
review the objections that traditionally have been raised against regularity accounts. It
will be shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity
theoretic sketches, which no present-day regularity theorists would seriously consider
worth a second thought. By outlining ways to refute these objections it will be argued
that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been
hasty – to say the least.
2 Hume’s Legacy
The philosophical core of regularity theories of causation, concisely put, consists of
three main tenets: (i) anti-realism with respect to the ontological status of the causal
relation, (ii) general causation3 – causation on type-level – as primary analysandum,
and (iii) universal regularities among event types as primary analysans.
According to Hume, the godfather of regularity theories, single event sequences are
not identifiable as being of causal nature by some inherent physical feature or property.
A causal interpretation of an event sequence is warranted only if the corresponding
events, understood as spatiotemporally located tokens or particulars,4 instantiate fac-
tors or event types5 which satisfy a material conditional as “WheneverA is instantiated,
B is instantiated” such that the instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally
proximate.6 Events do not cause themselves – no self-causation – and effects occur
nearby their causes – no action at a distance. For an event a to be identified as a cause
of another event b, it is, according to this conception, required that a instantiates a fac-
tor A whose instances are always followed by events of type B, which is instantiated
by b. Causes are thus analyzed to be sufficient conditions of their effects. This yields a
first Hume-inspired proposal for a regularity theoretic account of causation:
(I) A is a cause of B iff A is sufficient for B and the instances of A and B differ
and are spatiotemporally proximate.
(I), as well as the other regularity theoretic sketches discussed in this paper, heavily
relies on the notions of differing instances of factors and of spatiotemporal proximity.
Both of these notions call for clarifications, which for lack of space, however, cannot
be provided here. A mere pre-theoretic and intuitive understanding of when causal
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relata are identical as opposed to different and proximate as opposed to distant satis-
factorily meets the requirements of the upcoming considerations. Moreover, note that
the relational constraints (I) imposes on the instances of causes and effects forestall an
explication of the notion of a sufficient condition in terms of a simple propositional
material conditional. The same holds for necessary conditions, which will become of
importance below. Sidestepping all technical details, the notions of sufficient and nec-
essary conditions thus have to be understood with recourse to the first-order formalism.
Broad (1930) proposes the following definitions, which for reasons of simplicity will
not be explicitly (formally) spelled out here:
“C is a sufficient condition (. . . ) of E” means “Everything that has C has E”.
“C is a necessary condition (. . . ) of E” means “Everything that has E has C”.7
The simple identification of causes and sufficient conditions that are instantiated
nearby their conditioned factors as exemplified in (I) is the target of many well known
criticisms of regularity accounts.
3 Imperfect Regularities
There is an obvious first objection to this overly simple variety of a regularity anal-
ysis: Most causes plainly are not sufficient for their effects in the sense of (I) or, as
Hitchcock (2002) puts it, causal regularities commonly are imperfect regularities. It is
even highly dubious whether there in fact are any universal regularities as required by
(I) in nature at all. A factor A being a sufficient condition of a factor B such that the
(differing) instances of A and B are spatiotemporally proximate, thus, clearly is not a
necessary condition of A causing B.
Hume did not ignore the fact that factors whose instances are not universally corre-
lated may nonetheless be causally dependent. In this respect, (I) does not fully repro-
duce Hume’s analysis. In order for a factorA to be identifiable as a cause of a factorB,
Hume did not require A to be sufficient for B simpliciter, i.e. sufficient relative to any
causal background. Rather, he devised a cause to be sufficient for its effect only when
“plac’d in like circumstances”.8 Hence, common analyses of causation in terms of suf-
ficient conditions are supplemented by a ceteris paribus clause such that causes are
merely required to be ceteris paribus sufficient for their effects. These considerations
induce a modification of (I) to:
(II) A is a cause of B iff A is ceteris paribus sufficient for B and the instances of A
and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
However, the notion of a ceteris paribus clause is notoriously vague. (II) is only fruit-
fully applicable given a proper explication of the ceteris paribus proviso. For our
present purposes, a rough idea of what traditionally is meant by a ceteris paribus clause
will suffice. In order to provide such a rough idea, consider a match that is struck
against a matchbox and that, as a consequence thereof, catches fire. Refer to this sce-
nario as “S1”. What requirements does a second scenario S2 have to satisfy such that
Hume would classify S1 and S2 as “like circumstances”? Obviously, no two scenarios
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coincide with respect to all their properties or characteristics. At least in its spatiotem-
poral properties any scenario (or circumstance) S2 diverges from S1. For Hume to
speak of “like circumstances” S1 and S2 only have to share certain significant proper-
ties. The match in S1 is struck with a certain speed and thrust, it is exposed to a certain
amount of friction, and its flammable head is dry. Moreover, S1 features the presence
of enough oxygen. If S2 coincides with S1 relative to these kinds of properties, only a
proper subset of which have been explicitly included in the above list, S2 can be said to
satisfy the ceteris paribus clause with respect to S1, i.e. S1 and S2 can be referred to as
“like circumstances”. The properties that have to coincide in like circumstances share a
common feature: They are all causally relevant to the effect under consideration. This
induces a modification of (I) and (II) to:
(III) A is a cause of B iff there is a scenario S1 such that A is sufficient for B in S1 as
well as in all scenarios that agree with S1 as regards all causally relevant features
and the instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
Explicating the ceteris paribus proviso in this vein, of course, gives immediate rise
to circularity objections.9 (III) cannot be considered an analysis of the basal causal
notion any longer, for the definiens itself presupposes the notion of causal relevance.
In order to determine relative to which features of background conditions a factor A is
sufficient for a factor B, (III) calls for clarity on the causes of B, which is just what
(III) pretends to provide at the same time. Hence, integrating an explication of the ce-
teris paribus proviso along the lines of (III) into an analysis of causation is not feasible.
Nonetheless, the above considerations reveal an important feature of causal dependen-
cies: They are not one-to-one, but many-to-one dependencies. Or put differently, while
effects correspond to single factors, causes are complexes of jointly instantiated factors.
Consequently, striking a match is not autonomously sufficient for the match to catch
fire. Rather, factors as striking a match with a certain speed and thrust, dryness of its
flammable head, presence of enough oxygen etc. are jointly sufficient for the match to
light. Among the instances of these factors very specific spatiotemporal relations must
subsist in order for their combination to actually become causally sufficient. Bypassing
the problem of clarifying these spatiotemporal constraints for now, the ceteris paribus
proviso can now be suitably accounted for without explicitly having to integrate it into
an analysis of causation. For if a cause is no longer held to be autonomously sufficient
for its effect, but is taken to be a mere part of a sufficient condition, the ceteris paribus
clause can be dropped from (II) and (III) respectively.
(IV) A is a cause of B iff A is a part of a sufficient condition of B and the instances
of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
As long as sufficient conditions are simply understood to be antecedents of (universally
quantified) conditionals as indicated in section 2, the notion of a part of a sufficient
condition is straightforwardly explicable in terms of conjuncts of such antecedents.
(IV) is not refuted by a struck match that does not catch fire. Whenever a match is
struck, but fails to light, it may now be argued that – notwithstanding the striking – not
all factors of the corresponding complex sufficient condition for lighting matches have
been instantiated on the respective occasion.
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4 Monotony
Implementing regularities along the lines of (IV) to identify causal dependencies still
does not amount to a feasible analysis of causation, because there are regularities of
the required type that are not amenable to a causal interpretation. One such type of
regularities is due to the law of monotony: Antecedents of conditionals can salva veri-
tate be conjunctively supplemented by further factors. Monotony allows for arbitrarily
constructing complex sufficient conditions that are by no means causally interpretable.
Consider again the match example discussed above. Striking a match with a certain
speed and thrust, factor A, dryness of its flammable head (B), and presence of enough
oxygen (C), shall be assumed to be jointly sufficient for the corresponding match to
catch fire (D), i.e. A ∧ B ∧ C → D. Yet, if A, B, and C are jointly sufficient for the
match to light, the combination of A∧B ∧C and singing a song is thus sufficient, too.
Moreover, A∧B ∧C combined with singing a song and blinking an eye and wiggling
the left pinky toe are also going to be jointly sufficient for the match to catch fire. Or
formally:
A ∧B ∧ C → D ` A ∧B ∧ C ∧X → D, (1)
whereX stands for an arbitrary factor or conjunction of factors. This demonstrates that
being a part of a sufficient condition, i.e. being a conjunct within a sufficient conjunc-
tion of factors, is by no means sufficient for being a cause of the respective conditioned
factor.
Broad (1930) has been the first to propose a solution to this problem. He does not
analyze causes to be mere parts of sufficient conditions, but rather to be non-redundant
parts of such conditions. A non-redundant part of a sufficient condition can be spelled
out – in purely logical terms10 – as being a conjunct of a sufficient condition such that
if it is eliminated from that condition the latter loses its sufficiency for a corresponding
effect. Complex causes then are no longer understood as conjunctions of factors which
are jointly merely sufficient for their effect, but are newly taken to be minimally suffi-
cient conjunctions of factors – a minimally sufficient conjunction being a conjunction
that does not have sufficient proper parts.
(V) A is a cause of B iff A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition of B and the
instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
Applying (V) to the match example prohibits a causal interpretation of, say, the com-
bination of striking a match, presence of enough oxygen, dryness of the match, and
singing a song. The conjunction of these factors is merely sufficient, but not minimally
sufficient for the match to catch fire. One of its conjuncts, the singing, can be elimi-
nated without loss of sufficiency. Requiring a minimalization of sufficient conditions
in Broad’s sense precludes a causal interpretation of arbitrary extensions of sufficient
conditions based on the law of monotony.
5 Empty Regularities
Minimalizing sufficient conditions does not solve all the problems that can be induced
by monotony. Consider again the match example. As we have seen, the presence of
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oxygen, factor C, is not itself sufficient for a match to catch fire (D). Other factors – A
and B – have to be instantiated as well in order for D to occur. Yet, A ∧ B ∧ C is not
the only minimally sufficient condition containingC. Another such condition is consti-
tuted by the presence of oxygen and the absence of oxygen: C ∧ ¬C. A contradiction
is sufficient for any factor, not only for matches catching fire, but also for rain to fall
and elephants to be born. That C ∧ ¬C is moreover minimally sufficient for a match
to light can easily be verified by either removing C or ¬C, both of which is accom-
panied by a loss of sufficiency for D. More generally put: Material conditionals are
true if their antecedents are false or non-instantiated, or empty for short. Any regularity
statement along the lines of (V) whose antecedent is empty is, accordingly, termed an
empty regularity. Empty regularities do not only result from contradictory antecedents
and, thus, from logically non-instantiatable antecedents, but also from physically non-
instantiatable antecedents as, for instance, “Whenever Pegasus goes skiing, Lake Thun
is made of gold”.
The truth of empty regularity statements raises another often cited problem for
regularity accounts: Empty regularities are, notwithstanding their truth, not amenable
to a causal interpretation.11 The combination of absence and presence of oxygen –
C ∧ ¬C – does not cause the sinking of Mississippi steamers, even though C ∧ ¬C in
fact is minimally sufficient for these sinkings. Neither can Pegasus’ ski tour be seen as
a cause of the golden content of a lake.
Solutions to this problem are easily thought of. It is not the case that only a cer-
tain proper subset of all empty regularities consists of regularities that are not causally
interpretable, rather, no empty regularities are thus interpretable. Causal dependencies
subsist among entities that exist in nature. Inexistent things may not be causally re-
lated.12 Therefore, empty regularities can straightforwardly be excluded from causal
interpretability by adding a further constraint to (V) that requires the antecedent of
causally interpretable regularities to be non-empty.
(VI) A is a cause of B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition X1 of B,
(ii) the instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate, and
(iii) there is an instance of X1.
Alternatively it might be argued that event types or conjunctions of event types without
instances must not even be taken into consideration in the first place when it comes to
causal analyses. Thus, existence requirements with respect to causally analyzed factors
might be imposed as a kind of criterion of well-formedness for causal factors. Upon
opting for this solution to the empty regularities problem, which essentially amounts
to the same as a solution in the vein of (VI), an explicit modification of (V) can even
be dispensed with by simply relativizing regularities of type (V) to well-formed causal
factors.
6 Asymmetry
Another objection often raised against regularity accounts concerns the asymmetry of
causation. The cause-effect relation is asymmetric. A being a cause of B neither im-
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plies B to be a cause of A nor ¬B to be a cause of ¬A. However, by contraposition
A → B is a true material conditional iff ¬B → ¬A is so too. Which of these true
conditionals is to be causally interpreted? It is certainly not the case that a factor is
causally relevant to another factor iff the negation of the latter is causally relevant to
the negation of the former. Smoking is causally relevant to lung cancer, without the
absence of lung cancer having causal impact on abstinence from smoking. Accord-
ingly, many critics of regularity theories have claimed that regularity accounts cannot
adequately distinguish between causes and effects.13 (VI) identifies A to be cause ofB
iff it identifies ¬B to be cause of ¬A, which indicates that we have not come up with
an adequate regularity theoretic analysis of causation yet.
Satisfactorily mirroring the asymmetry of causation is an intricate problem not only
faced by regularity accounts, but by virtually all presently known theories of causation.
Normally the direction of causation is accounted for with recourse to some asymme-
try external to the conceptual framework used in the analysans of causation as – most
prominently – the direction of time or human manipulation and intervention.14 Ap-
plied to the regularity theory considered here, this could possibly yield that material
conditionals in the sense of (VI) are causally interpretable only if the instances of the
antecedent precede the instances of the consequent. Along these lines, one of A → B
and ¬B → ¬A could be excluded from causal interpretability. However, accounting
for the asymmetry of causation by means of an asymmetry that is external to the con-
ceptual framework of a respective analysans of the causal relation is a high theoretical
price to pay. One would have to account for the direction of time independently of
the direction of causation and thus deviate from an often adopted programme in the
philosophy of time that takes the direction of causation to be primary.15 Resorting to
manipulation, on the other hand, relativizes the asymmetry of causation to human inter-
vention, where intuitively this asymmetry seems to be perfectly independent of human
existence. Causal processes – as planetary movements or volcanic eruptions on Saturn
– that are not manipulable by humans are asymmetric and orientable just as everyday
earthly processes as the breaking of a window or the starting of a car engine which are
open to human intervention. Moreover, it is unclear how the notions of agency, inter-
vention, and manipulation could be clarified without recourse to the causal relation. In
fact, these notions seem to straight-out presuppose clarity on causation.
This is a generalizable consequence of implementing any external asymmetry for a
theoretical account of the asymmetry of causation: The external asymmetry becomes
more basic than the cause-effect relation. Thereby a straightforward causal analysis of
these external asymmetries is blocked. However, intervention, for instance, can hardly
be more transparently analyzed than in terms of causal processes where human action
is involved as a cause. As long as we are not inevitably constrained to an analysis
of the direction of causation by means of an external asymmetry, theoretical foresight
calls for abstinence from recourse to such asymmetries. Indeed, regularity theories are
capable of capturing the direction of causation without recourse to asymmetries that are
external to the conceptual framework of a regularity theoretic analysans of causation.
The cause-effect relation can be oriented on mere logical grounds. Roughly, while
conditional dependencies among single factors cannot be attributed a direction without
resorting to external asymmetries, complex nets of such dependencies are orientable
based on existing regularities only. There are several alternative causes for each effect.
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A match can be lit by either striking it against a match box, by exposing it to fire or
to a flammable chemical etc. Accordingly, causally interpretable regularities are far
more complex than expressed by (VI). Rather than merely one minimally sufficient
condition A ∧C ∧D, a whole number of alternative minimally sufficient conditions –
A ∧C ∧D, E ∧ F ∧G,H ∧ I ∧ J ,. . . – must be invoked for each effect. On the other
hand, an effect does not occur without the presence of at least one of its alternative
causes. Thus, whenever the effect is given, at least one of its alternative minimally
sufficient conditions is given as well. These mutual dependencies among causes and
effects are tentatively16 expressible by means of a biconditional as in (2).
(A ∧ C ∧D) ∨ (E ∧ F ∧G) ∨ (H ∧ I ∧ J)↔ B (2)
Each complex cause of B is minimally sufficient for B, while the disjunction of all al-
ternative causes is necessary for B.17 (2) is not symmetrical with respect to the factors
to the left and the right of “↔”. The instantiation of a particular disjunct is minimally
sufficient for B, but not vice versa. B does not determine a particular disjunct to be
instantiated.18 B only determines the whole disjunction of minimally sufficient condi-
tions. Hence, given that an instantiation ofA∧C∧D is observed, it can be inferred that
there is an instance B somewhere in the corresponding spatiotemporal neighborhood.
On the other hand, if an instance of B is observed, no such inference to a proximate in-
stantiation of A∧C ∧D is possible. The observed instance of B might well have been
caused byE∧F ∧G. This asymmetry corresponds to the asymmetry of determination.
It induces a specification of (VI) along the following lines:
(VII) A is a cause of B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition X1 of B,
(ii) X1 is a disjunct contained in a disjunction X1 ∨X2 ∨ . . . ∨Xn, n ≥ 2, of
other minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that X1 ∨X2 ∨ . . . ∨Xn
is necessary for B,
(iii) the instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate, and
(iv) there is an instance of X1, X2, . . . , and of Xn.
Clearly though, by contraposition (2) is equivalent to
¬B ↔ ¬(A ∧ C ∧D) ∧ ¬(E ∧ F ∧G) ∧ ¬(H ∧ I ∧ J) (3)
However, in view of the fact that effects have several alternative causes, (VII) restricts
the causal interpretability of complex regularity statements to one specific syntacti-
cal form. Within a set of logically equivalent regularity statements, only expressions
with a syntax that exhibits alternative minimally sufficient conditions as disjuncts of a
necessary condition are causally interpretable. Applied to (2) and (3), this syntactical
constraint prohibits a causal interpretation of (3) for it does not render an underlying
causal structure transparent in the sense just delineated.
(3) is moreover equivalent to a biconditional that results from (3) by factoring out
and bringing the righthand side back into disjunctive normal form:
(¬A ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬H) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬E ∧ ¬I) ∨ . . . ∨ (¬D ∧ ¬G ∧ ¬J)↔ ¬B (4)
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In contrast to (3), (4) is unproblematically causally interpretable. While (2) identi-
fies three minimally sufficient conditions as complex causes of B, (4) establishes the
causally interpretable minimally sufficient conditions of ¬B. Each of those conditions
amounts to a conjunction consisting of the negation of exactly one conjunct of each
disjunct of (2). Furthermore, (4) does not reverse the direction of the causal depen-
dencies expressed in (2). Both identify B and ¬B respectively as effects and the other
factors as causes. Thus, there is one regularity statement complying to the syntactical
constraints imposed by (VII) for a positive effect and one for the latter’s negative com-
plement. Both of these regularities exhibit the same asymmetry. Accordingly, neither
of them poses a problem for (VII).
Accounting for the asymmetry of causation in this vein has an important implica-
tion as regards the minimal complexity of causal structures. A factor or conjunction of
factors X1, that is both minimally sufficient and necessary for another factor or con-
junction of factorsX2, cannot be identified as cause ofX2, forX2 would be minimally
sufficient and necessary for X1 as well. All empirical evidence such a dependency
structure would generate are perfectly correlated instantiations of X1 and X2 – both
would either be co-instantiated or absent. Such empirical data is not causally inter-
pretable. In order to distinguish causes from effects and to orient the cause-effect
relation, at least two alternative causes are needed for each effect.
Plainly, this is merely a rough sketch of how the direction of causation can be ac-
counted for on regularity theoretic grounds. More would have to be said on these mat-
ters. For now, however, it must suffice to note that, contrary to the widespread opinion
in the literature, regularity theories not only seem capable of adequately capturing the
asymmetry of the cause-effect relation, but moreover offer the prospect of success-
fully doing so without resorting to asymmetries external to the conceptual framework
implemented in their analysans of causation. Against this background, such external
asymmetries as the direction of time or of human intervention remain amenable to a
straightforward analysis in terms of the asymmetry of causation.
7 Spurious Regularities
One of the most widespread criticisms against regularity theories stems from so-called
spurious regularities.19 Consider two parallel effects A and B of a common cause
C – a structure commonly labelled an epiphenomenon – and assume for simplicity’s
sake that C in fact is minimally sufficient for A and B. Such as to do justice to the
complexity of causal structures let us suppose there exists one minimally sufficient
alternative cause for A and B each – D for A and E for B. All in all, the causal
structure under consideration thus is assumed to be of a form as depicted in figure
1.20 In this constellation, A in combination with the absence of D, i.e. A ∧ ¬D, is
minimally sufficient for B without A ∧ ¬D being a complex cause of B. Whenever
A ∧ ¬D occurs, C is present as well, for no effect occurs without any of its causes.
Hence, if D is absent, C must be present to account for A. Furthermore, since C is
taken to be sufficient forB, it follows that A∧¬D is thus sufficient as well. Of course,
A ∧ ¬D is moreover part of a necessary condition of B:
(A ∧ ¬D) ∨ C ∨ E ↔ B (5)
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Fig. 1: An epiphenomenon that gives rise to spurious regularities.
According to (VII), (5) is a regularity statement that is causally interpretable. This
clearly is an unacceptable consequence, for, as mentioned above, relative to the con-
struction of the structure in figure 1, A ∧ ¬D does not cause B.
Structures as the one under consideration are ubiquitous in nature. The most fa-
mous concrete example of this type, undoubtedly, is the so-calledManchester-Factory-
Hooters example based on which Mackie (1974) ultimately abandoned the attempt to
provide a genuine regularity theoretic analysis of causation.21 Examples of this type
unmistakably demonstrate that necessary conditions, just as sufficient conditions, may
contain redundant factors. A being necessary for B implies that A∨C is necessary for
B. Or formally:
B → A ` B → A ∨ C. (6)
Any true conditional stays true if any (true or false) disjunct is added to its consequent.
Analogous to the case of sufficient conditions, the extendability of necessary condi-
tions by arbitrary disjuncts forecloses a causal interpretability of necessary conditions.
A causal interpretation of necessary conditions is only warranted if the conditions ex-
clusively contain factors that are essential to the bringing about of the purported effect.
Arbitrary factors as C in (6) or conditions as A∧¬D in (5) must, even if they are min-
imally sufficient, not be incorporated in causally interpretable necessary conditions.
Graßhoff and May (2001) and May (1999) have proposed an analogous solution
to this problem as in case of the difficulties induced by monotony. They call for a
minimalization of necessary conditions. The basic idea behind the minimalization of
necessary conditions coincides with the criterion guiding the minimalization of suffi-
cient conditions: A necessary condition is minimally necessary iff it does not contain
a necessary proper part. Minimalizing necessary conditions based on this notion of a
minimally necessary condition in fact eliminates all and just the spurious minimally
sufficient conditions as A ∧ ¬D from complex regularity statements as (5). Properly
substantiating this point, however, requires a certain technical apparatus that cannot
be introduced here.22 For now, it must suffice to illustrate the minimalization of (5).
Consider again the structure depicted in figure 1: Whenever B is given, either C or E
is instantiated. Thus, C∨E is necessary forB. The antecedent of (5) has no other nec-
essary proper part. (A∧¬D)∨C is not necessary, for there are instances of B without
A ∧ ¬D and C being instantiated – say, when A ∧D is given along with ¬C and E.
Neither is (A ∧ ¬D) ∨E necessary for B: There are instances of B without instances
of A ∧ ¬D and E occurring – for example, when A ∧D is given in combination with
¬E and C. Thus, there in fact exists a suitable refinement of (VII) that allows for an
appropriate handling of spurious correlations on regularity theoretic grounds.
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(VIII) A is a cause of B iff the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition X1 of B,
(ii) X1 is a disjunct contained in a disjunction X1 ∨X2 ∨ . . . ∨Xn, n ≥ 2, of
other minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that X1 ∨X2 ∨ . . . ∨Xn
is minimally necessary for B,
(iii) the instances of A and B differ and are spatiotemporally proximate.
As May (1999) has shown, introducing a minimality constraint on necessary con-
ditions has a very important existential implication that allows for dropping condition
(iv) of (VII). C ∨ E being minimally necessary for B implies there being an instance
of B without a corresponding instance of C – refer to this scenario by S1 – and an
instance of B without a corresponding instance of E – scenario S2. That is, none of
the two disjuncts is itself necessary for B. Nonetheless the disjunction as a whole is
thus necessary. Therefore, both in S1 and in S2 there must be an instance of C ∨ E.
Since in S1, by assumption, there is no event of type C, there must be an event of type
E – and vice versa for S2. This finding is generalizable: Every disjunct of a minimally
necessary condition is instantiated at least once along with the corresponding effect,
when all the other disjuncts are absent.23
8 Single-Case Regularities
A problem that is closely related to the problem of empty regularities has e.g. been
raised by Armstrong (1983). A conditional turns out true if both its antecedent and
consequent are true. Thus, if antecedent and consequent of a conditional each report
the occurrence of a singular event that actually has occurred, the conditional as a whole
is true. Therefore, Armstrong argues, a regularity as required by a regularity theory
subsists among any two occurring events, irrespective of whether they are causally re-
lated or not. No doubt, a conditional as “Whenever Nero sets fire on Rome, the Titanic
sinks” is true and no doubt, we are not prepared to hold Nero causally responsible for
the sinking of the Titanic. Hence, Armstrong’s argument continues, not only empty,
but also these so-called single-case regularities pose a serious problem for a regularity
theoretic analysis of causation.
At first, it must be pointed out that the plain truth of a conditional as “Whenever
Nero sets fire on Rome, the Titanic sinks” does not suffice to identify Nero’s setting
fire on Rome as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic according to any of the regularity
theoretic accounts (I) to (VIII) considered thus far. For these accounts not only require
causes and effects to satisfy a material conditional, but moreover to be proximately
instantiated. Even though the notion of spatiotemporal proximity has not been prop-
erly explicated here, relative to any pre-theoretic understanding of that notion, it seems
plain that Nero’s setting fire on Rome and the sinking of the Titanic cannot be seen
as proximate events. However, this shortcoming of Armstrong’s argument is easily
remedied. Assume that Harold Bride, the junior wireless operator on the Titanic, for
the first (and only) time in his life lit a Havana cigar moments before the ship hit the
iceberg. The conditional “Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana, the Titanic sinks”
is true and, moreover, the events mentioned in its antecedent and consequent are spa-
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tiotemporally proximate. Of course, Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not only sufficient,
but moreover minimally sufficient for the Titanic to sink. The antecedent of the above
mentioned conditional does not comprise a sufficient proper part. Furthermore, Bride’s
lighting of a Havana is not the only minimally sufficient condition of the sinking of the
Titanic. The latter’s real cause constituted by the collision with the iceberg amounts to
another such condition. Hence, there is a necessary condition of the sinking of the Ti-
tanic that contains Bride’s lighting of a Havana as a minimally sufficient disjunct. This
suffices to refine Armstrong’s argument such that it does justice to the complexity of
causal structures as required by (VII): Any two actually occurring events that are spa-
tiotemporally proximate satisfy a regularity as required by (VII), yet by no means all
thus related events are causally related as well. Consequently, (VII) does not amount
to a sufficient condition for causal relatedness.
That (VII) is unsuited as analysans of causation has already been demonstrated by
the problem of spurious regularities. In order for Armstrong to succeed in establishing
that single-case regularities prove the fundamental defectiveness of regularity accounts,
his argument must be tailored to be directed against (VIII). It thus must be shown
that Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not only contained in a necessary condition of the
sinking of the Titanic, but is moreover a non-redundant part of a causally interpretable
minimally necessary condition thereof.
Before this further refinement will be attempted a possible objection against Arm-
strong’s argument has to be considered. Antecedent and consequent of “Whenever
Harold Bride lights a Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks” involve proper names or, if for-
mal explications by means of definite descriptions are preferred, predicates that apply
to single events only – more generally: local predicates, i.e. predicates that involve
spacetime coordinates or singular terms. The admissibility of local predicates in law-
like contexts, as is well known, is commonly denied in the literature. Causal dependen-
cies do not exclusively subsist in local domains as the one constituted by the Titanic’s
maiden voyage. Harold Bride’s lighting of a Havana cigar is a cause of the sinking of
the Titanic if and only if lighting Havana cigars generally cause ocean liners to sink.
In view of this universality of causal dependencies and, moreover, in light of the basic
intuition behind regularity accounts according to which only repeated instantiations of
factors allow for causal diagnoses, it is plain that proper names and local predicates
must be excluded from well-formed factor definitions. Armstrong’s argument might
thus be rejected for its involvement of factors that are defined by means of local pred-
icates and that, accordingly, are not well-defined causal factors. Yet, as Armstrong
points out, especially in macroscopic contexts as the one under consideration every
predicate involving local constraints may well be replaceable by a co-extensional non-
local predicate.24 For instance, “. . . is Harold Bride’s lighting of a Havana cigar” could
be replaced by a conjunction of arbitrary non-local properties that, taken together, hap-
pen to apply to exactly one event, namely Harold Bride’s lighting of a Havana cigar.
Or instead of by use of a proper name, Harold Bride might be referred to by specifying
his genome, while the Titanic is individuatable by means of its molecular structure.
So let us grant that “Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks”
represents the exact same single-case regularity as “Whenever a person with genome
s lights a Havana cigar, an ocean liner with molecular structure t sinks”, or formally
S → T , which constitutes a single-case regularity involving non-local predicates and
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thus well-defined causal factors only.
The Titanic’s collision with the iceberg, of course, is expressible by means of non-
local predicates as well. Symbolizing this (non-locally defined) collision by C we get
the following true biconditional that is causally interpretable according to (VII):
S ∨ C ↔ T. (7)
If S ∨ C is not merely necessary, but moreover minimally necessary for T , (7) not
only refutes (VII), but also (VIII). S ∨ C, however, does not amount to a minimally
necessary condition of T . There is only one single instance of each factor involved in
(7). Whenever T occurs, both S and C are present nearby. Thus, the antecedent of (7)
can be further minimalized:
S ↔ T (8)
C ↔ T (9)
Neither (8) nor (9), however, are causally interpretable, for these expressions merely
report a perfect correlation of T and S and C respectively. Any of these factors is
given if and only if the other two factors are given as well. Such perfect correlations, as
we have seen above, are not causally interpretable, for none of the involved factors is
identifiable as cause and effect respectively. Since (VIII) requires causally interpretable
regularities to specify minimally necessary conditions of a certain minimal complexity,
neither (8) nor (9) is amenable to a causal interpretation according to (VIII). That,
however, does not mean that (VIII) does not allow for identifying the collision with the
iceberg as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic. A different and more coarse-grained
typing of the occurrences involved in the sinking of the Titanic will yield far more
instances for each causal factor, which, in turn will suspend biconditional dependencies
as in (8) or (9).
All in all, a regularity theoretic analysis of causation imposes certain minimal com-
plexity constraints on causal structures. Causal structures are not one-to-one dependen-
cies among single factors. Every effect has several alternative complex causes. In order
to establish such dependencies, more than one single instance of causes and effects is
required. The regularity theoretic notion of causation expressed in (VIII) mirrors these
minimal complexity requirements and, accordingly, is not affected by the problem of
single-case regularities.
9 Singular Causation
The problem posed by single-case regularities demonstrates that a regularity theory
cannot be successful if its analysans is taken to be singular causation, i.e. causation
among token events. In order to account for the complexity of a causal structure several
instances of that structure are needed. Nonetheless, some regularity theories, as e.g. de-
veloped in Mackie (1965), primarily analyze singular causation. A lot of the critisicm
raised against regularity theories over the past three decades targets this kind of sin-
gularist account. Some exemplary objections include the following: Among others,
Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004) claim, singularist regularity theories cannot adequately
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handle cases of preemption. Kim (1973) criticizes Mackie (1965) for not being able to
adequately assign token events as causes to concrete singular effects – a problem that
has come to be known as the pairing problem. Finally, many authors – good examples
of which can also be found in Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004) – have raised doubts about
whether regularity theories can satisfactorily handle cases of causation among absences
and omissions.
First of all, none of these objections exclusively aims at regularity theories. Coun-
terfactual causation – as is well known – faces fundamental difficulties when it comes
to cases of preemption.25 The pairing problem, in turn, affects any account of causa-
tion that imposes some (deliberately) vague spatiotemporal proximity constraints on
the causal relata. And any analysis of causation that takes the causal relata to be events
has a hard time accounting for causation among absences and omissions. Second, since
my main concern here is the canonical criticism exclusively brought forward against
regularity theories of the Humean type, this singularist branch of criticism cannot not
be given adequate consideration in the present context.
Nonetheless, however, any philosophical account of causation that wants to be
taken seriously has to say something about singular causation. Thus, a regularity theory
cannot contend itself with analyzing general causation. Any theory that is primarily in-
terested in general causation has to provide some account of how causal dependencies
among tokens are derivable from causal dependencies among types. In light of (VIII),
the following transition from general to singular causation is easily thought of:
Singular Causation: Event a is a cause of event b iff the following conditions hold:
(i) a instantiates a factor A and b instantiates a factor B such that A and B are
causally related in terms of (VIII)
(ii) every other factor X , that is part of that minimally sufficient condition of
B which A is part of, is instantiated coincidently with a.
To what extent this analysis of singular causation successfully deals with cases of
preemption, the pairing problem, and with causation among absences and omissions
has to left open here. What matters for now is that there are no principled obstacles to
implementing an analysis of general causation along the lines of (VIII) when it comes
to accounting for singular causation.
10 Indeterminism
The discussion of the thus far considered arguments against regularity accounts re-
vealed that common objections either attack overly simplistic or singularist regularity
theoretic analyses. None of these objections affects a regularity account that both ad-
equately represents the whole complexity of causal structures and gives preference to
type-level dependencies. Still, there is one conventional argument often put forward
against regularity theories that neither targets an oversimplified nor a singularist ac-
count. With the advent of quantum mechanics, it appears that some processes as e.g.
radioactive decay both run irreducibly indeterministically and are to be qualified as be-
ing of causal nature. Accordingly, the second half of the 20th century has seen the rise
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of probabilistic analyses of causation as for instance proposed by Reichenbach (1956)
or Suppes (1970), who took these indeterministic processes as sufficient evidence to the
effect that building a theory of causation on the principle of determinism, as regularity
accounts generally do, is fundamentally mistaken.
While the previously considered objections do not question the principle of deter-
minism and thereby the conceptual fundament of regularity accounts, that is just what
this argument from indeterminism does. Criticizing regularity theories in this vein pre-
supposes that there are causal processes that run irreducibly indeterministically. While
the existence of irreducibly indeterministic processes is hardly challengeable according
to standard interpretations of quantum mechanics26, there are many open questions – as
for instance raised by phenomena of the EPR type27 – with respect to the causal inter-
pretability of these processes. The causal interpretability of indeterministic processes is
even more questionable as not even modern probabilistic theories of causation can suc-
cessfully account for these processes. The latter violate central assumptions of prob-
abilistic analyses of the cause-effect relation, as the Reichenbachian common cause
principle28 or the causal Markov assumption.29 In consequence thereof, probabilistic
accounts of causation are forced to limit their scope to so-called pseudo-indeterministic
processes, i.e. processes whose indeterminacy is merely due to incomplete knowledge
of or control over the involved factors.30
The question as to whether the irreducibly probabilistic progression of quantum
mechanical processes poses a problem to a regularity account of causation in the end
boils down to what pre-theoretic understanding of the notion of a cause-effect relation
is presupposed. Or put differently: Irreducibly probabilistic processes pose a problem
to a regularity account only if such processes are to be identified as causal processes.
If, however, the notion of a causal dependency is taken to be essentially tied to such
principles as the principle of determinism, quantum mechanical processes are not clas-
sified as causal to begin with. Against such a conceptual background, indeterminism,
rather than compromising regularity accounts, raises questions as to how it can “be the
case in an indeterminist world that some events are causally determined while others
are not”.31 Indeed, in view of irreducibly indeterministic processes, the regularity the-
orist might well retreat to a more moderate position according to which several types
of causal relations can be distinguished, one of which – prevalent in macroscopic con-
texts – being a deterministic relation. Then he could propagate his account as analysis
of just that deterministic causal relation.32
11 Conclusion
Of the standard arguments against regularity theories all but one target over-simplified
theoretical sketches, which by no means conform to modern regularity theoretic anal-
yses. Present-day regularity theories successfully handle imperfect, empty and single-
case regularities, adequately represent epiphenomenal structures and capture the asym-
metry of the causal relation. In short, they do justice to the whole complexity of causal
structures. And all this is accomplished with simple recourse to extensional standard
logic. Appropriate minimalization strategies are at hand such that redundancies im-
plicit in material conditionals – e.g. due to monotony – can efficaciously be precluded
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from a causal interpretation. The theoretical price for this technical straightforwardness
is that regularity theories have to subscribe to the principle of determinism which may
well not be universally valid in light of standard interpretations of quantum mechanics.
However, in view of the overall lack of a theoretical framework that can successfully
causally interpret irreducibly indeterministic processes, regularity theories can be seen
as a promising and very intuitive alternative to popular theoretical frameworks as im-
plemented by counterfactual or probabilistic analyses. Moreover, if it is ultimately
found that there in fact are indeterministic causal processes on micro level, regularity
theories can be propagated as analyses of deterministic macroscopic causal dependen-
cies.
Notes
1Cf. section 10.
2Cf. Baumgartner (forthcoming).
3There are some regularity theoretic proposals that do not subscribe to this tenet, e.g. Mackie (1965), (cf.
section 9).
4This focus on events does not straightforwardly cover cases of causally related absences or omissions.
The problems posed by causal dependencies as between omitted vaccination and contracting influenza will
be neglected in the present context. They are treated in Baumgartner (forthcoming), ch. 3. For interesting
proposals on how to deal with causation among absences cf. also Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004).
5The notion of an event type can be broadly spelled out in terms of event classes, such that instantiation
of a type by an event token is easily explicable with reference to the membership relation. For details cf.
Baumgartner (forthcoming), ch. 2.
6Hume originally required temporal succession, not mere proximity, for causally related events (cf.
Hume (1999 (1748)), p. 146). In accordance with the usual practice, causes and effects are here only re-
quired to be spatiotemporally proximate such as not to preclude the possibility of simultaneous or backward
causation on a priori grounds (cf. section 6).
7Broad (1930), p. 306.
8Cf. Hume (1978 (1740)), p. 105.
9Cf. Brand and Swain (1970), p. 222.
10Not all critics of regularity accounts have taken note of these purely logical ways to minimalize sufficient
conditions. For instance, in 1970 Brand and Swain still erroneously claimed that minimalizing sufficient
conditions cannot be accomplished in non-causal and, thus, non-circular terms (cf. Brand and Swain (1970),
p. 226).
11Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983).
12“Inexistent” in this context is not to be read as “has occurred prior to a specific moment of investigation”,
but rather is to be understood in terms of “has not occurred in all past and will not occur in all future”. As
mentioned above, the problem of causally interpreted omissions or absences shall be bypassed here. We are
thus concerned with causation among positive factors only. (Cf. footnote 4 above).
13Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983), ch. 2.
14Cf. e.g. Suppes (1970) or Price (1992).
15Cf. e.g. Reichenbach (1956).
16(2) is a mere tentative formal representation, for, as mentioned in section 2, propositional logic does not
allow for adequately expressing the relational constraints implicit in causal regularities in the sense of (VI).
Cf. Graßhoff and May (2001) or Baumgartner (forthcoming) for details on the first-order representation of
these dependencies.
17This essentially corresponds to Mackie’s (1974) famous analysis of causation in terms of so-called
INUS-conditions. Mackie (1974) will not be given an in-depth review in the present context. This has been
done in Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), ch. 5.
18Cf. Graßhoff and May (2001), pp. 97-99. Similar analyses of the direction of causation have been
proposed in Sanford (1976) or Hausman (1998).
19Cf. e.g. Cartwright (1989), pp. 25-29.
References 17
20The graphical notation implemented here is properly introduced in Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004),
ch. 3.
21Cf. Mackie (1974), p. 83 et seq., Cartwright (1989), pp. 25-29. In Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004),
pp. 99-103, we have discussed the Manchester-Hooters in all detail along with a solution to this problem.
22For more details cf. Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004) or Baumgartner (forthcoming).
23Cf. May (1999), pp. 67-68.
24Cf. Armstrong (1983), ch. 1.
25For details about how a regularity theory along the lines of (VIII) deals with preemption cf. Graßhoff
and May (2001), pp. 104-105.
26Nonetheless there also are deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (cf. Albert (1992)).
27Cf. van Fraassen (1989).
28Cf. Reichenbach (1956).
29Cf. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000 (1993)).
30Cf. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000 (1993)), or Cartwright (1999).
31Cf. Xu (1997), p. 137. Accordingly, Xu (1997) proposes a deterministic analysis of causation that he
claims to be compatible with indeterminism. Similarly: Belnap (2005).
32Confining oneself to such a moderate position seems advisable for determinists in view of arguments in
favor of a causal interpretation of irreducibly indeterministic processes as e.g. presented in Mellor (1995),
ch. 5.
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